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Impact Assessment
in the
European Union
By Craig Robertson Craig Robertson Craig Robertson Craig Robertson Craig Robertson*1
Integrated Impact Assessment (IA) – the ex-ante examination of potential social, economic and
environmental impacts – lies at the heart of the European Commission’s Better Regulation
programme. By making a commitment to systematically consider the potential consequences
of its major legislative and policy-defining proposals, the European Commission has put itself
at the forefront of a wider move towards evidence-based policy-making. The approach it has
adopted follows a set of logical, analytical steps and is underpinned by a set of procedural
requirements which are now being rigorously enforced by the recently-established Impact
Assessment Board. Responsibility for preparing and using impact assessments is also shared by
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
In June 2002, the European Commission announced that
it would replace its previous sector-based impact analyses
with an integrated Impact Assessment (IA) process, which
would require the ex-ante examination of potential social,
economic and environmental impacts of European
Commission proposals. It would also involve a test against
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as
a requirement to consult with stakeholders as part of the
overall analysis. Since then, IA has become the cornerstone
of the European Commission’s efforts to deliver on its
commitments to the shared objectives (shared by the
Member States and institutions of the EU) to simplify and
improve the regulatory environment for Europe’s citizens
and businesses.
The Commission decision to introduce the new approach
to IA was taken in the context of the EU Lisbon and
Sustainable Development Strategies, and the debate on
“Good Governance” within the Member States and
Institutions of the European Union. This means that IA
ought to be seen not simply as a means of ensuring that EU
entrepreneurs are not burdened with unnecessary “red-
tape”, but also as a means of better informing political
decision-makers about potential trade-offs between the
social, economic and environmental dimensions. It is also
important in promoting “good governance” by, for example,
the systematic consultation with stakeholders as part of the
IA process.
One of the most important and key founding principles
of the IA approach in the Commission is that the results of
the IA are considered as part of, but do not determine, the
final political decision. As the 2002 Communication on
Impact Assessment2 made clear:
“Impact Assessment is an aid to decision-making, not
a substitute for political judgement.”
The Commission IA Approach The Commission IA Approach The Commission IA Approach The Commission IA Approach The Commission IA Approach
Each Commission IA should follow certain analytical steps.
In the first instance, it ought to examine the policy problem
or challenge, including consideration of how it will evolve
and the impacts of any actions already taken or in the
pipeline. It also needs to consider at this stage whether the
EU has the right to act, and is the most appropriate level for
action to be taken.
Full consideration of the policy challenge should then
allow for clear policy objectives to be set which will be
directly related to the specific problem. Essentially the policy
objectives are the “desired impacts”, and they ought to be
specific enough to allow for effective monitoring and
evaluation as to whether they are subsequently being
achieved. This stage in the IA process is also the point at
which explicit consideration needs to be given to the
consistency between the policy objectives in this particular
initiative and other policy areas, and with wider EU policies
or strategies, such as Lisbon and/or Sustainable
Development.
The next analytical step is to develop a range of
alternative policy approaches or options, each with the
potential to meet the policy objectives. There are few
absolute requirements in the Commission’s Guidelines,
but the need to include the option of “No EU Action” is one
of them (unless there is an explicit Treaty obligation for EU
action to be taken). There is also strong encouragement to
include policy options or approaches which fall into the
category of alternatives to traditional forms of regulation.
This could include systems of co- or self-regulation, or
Open Method of Co-ordination, or market-based
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instruments, etc.
Each of the policy options identified as being feasible in
meeting the set objectives (normally anything between 3-6
options) should then be analysed in terms of their potential
economic, social and environmental impacts. Direct and
indirect, positive and negative impacts ought to be
considered for each option,
with the analysis also ex-
amining if these impacts will
have consequences beyond
the borders of the EU. In line
with the principle of pro-
portionate analysis, in some
instances it will be considered
acceptable for the impact
analysis to be entirely
descriptive and qualitative
in nature. However, where
there are likely to be more
significant or controversial
impacts, greater efforts
ought to be made to assign
quantitative or monetary
values to the impacts.
Each of the analysed
options or approaches can then be compared in terms of
their potential impacts and against the evaluation criteria
of “effectiveness” in meeting the objectives, “efficiency” in
terms of meeting the objectives while minimising direct
costs, and “consistency” with other policies or strategies. It
ought also to be possible to assess each option’s compatibility
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. At
this point it is important to underline that there is no
requirement in the Impact Assessment Guidelines for a full
Cost-Benefit Analysis to be carried out.
Underpinning each of the analytical steps outlined
above, is a set of procedures that need to be followed by the
Commission DG responsible for preparing the IA. Since
2005 there is a general rule that all items included in the
Commission’s Annual Policy Strategy (APS) and Legislative
and Work Programme (CLWP) are subject to IA. However,
in addition to this requirement, IAs are also being carried
out on important items that do not feature in these key
annual policy documents, including some implementing
measures under Comitology procedures.
Preparation of the IA is the responsibility of the
Commission DG which has submitted the item for inclusion
in the APS or CLWP. However, in many cases it has been
judged necessary to use external assistance in preparing
the IA. Although it is possible for the external consultant to
do the vast majority of the IA-related work, it is not possible
for the DG to present the external study as the final IA
Report. This Report, which should be the summary of the full
IA process and findings, is a Commission document. The
work of the lead Commission DG and/or the external
consultant will normally be guided by an Inter-Service
Steering Group (ISSG), consisting of representatives of
other interested DGs. The ISSG is meant to ensure that the
IA takes as wide a perspective as necessary, and that issues
of consistency with other policies or strategies are also fully
considered.
Failure to start preparation of the IA early enough in the
policy development process has been identified by many
observers as one key factor in the patchy quality and
usefulness of Commission IAs, since it is finalised too late
to have any real effect on the policy proposal itself. This is
in spite of the integration of IA with the Commission’s
Strategic Planning and Programming cycle, which requires
submission of so-called Roadmaps for items included in the
APS and CLWP. The Roadmaps are available to other DGs
in the preparation of the APS and CLWP, which allows them
to verify that the IA is likely to
cover all impacts that they
see as relevant or important,
and to plan their contribution
as part of the ISSG. Once
the Commission has adopt-
ed the CLWP, the Roadmaps
for all those items that
eventually were included are
made publicly available
alongside the CLWP. This
allows stakeholders, Mem-
ber States, European Parlia-
mentarians, etc to examine
the Commission’s early IA
work and its plans for
completion of the IA. It will
also allow them to prepare
for any contribution that they
may wish to make as part of a stakeholder consultation
exercise.
At the same time as it adopted the integrated IA
approach, the Commission also adopted minimum
standards for consultation with stakeholders.3 These also
apply for consultations carried out as part of a Commission
IA. The minimum standards state that the Commission DG
needs to be clear in the aims of the consultation exercise
e.g. is it for brainstorming or is it to test opinion. It also
needs to consult all relevant parties. The consultations also
need to be made available on a single access point,
avoiding the need for stakeholders to go looking for
consultations in various places. There is also a minimum
time limit of eight weeks for public consultations, and a
requirement that the Commission provides feedback on the
input it has received from stakeholders, either in the IA, the
Communication or the Explanatory Memorandum.
As noted earlier, the end product of the IA process is an
Impact Assessment Report. This should be a fair summary
of the work carried out as part of the IA process, and should
be clear in setting-out any uncertainties or assumptions in
the analysis. External or separate studies, or results of
stakeholder consultation exercises should be annexed to
the IA Report (or web links provided to where the documents
can be found). The IA Report is required to be completed in
all cases, even when a decision has been taken not to
proceed with the proposal. This is particularly important if
the decision not to proceed is based upon consideration of
the evidence gathered as part of the IA. Until recently there
had been no instances of an IA Report being prepared for
an aborted policy initiative. However, the work of the
recently-established Impact Assessment Board or IAB (see
below) has made its presence felt in this respect, and there
are now IA Reports which set out clear reasons as to why a
decision has been taken not to proceed with the proposal.
The IA Report is a Commission Staff Working Document
and is given a “SEC” document reference. This is significant
for two main reasons. The first, more practical, reason is
that SEC documents do not need to be translated into all
Community languages. The IA Report can be drafted in any
Since 2005 there is a
general rule that all items
included in the
Commission’s Annual Policy
Strategy (APS) and
Legislative and Work
Programme (CLWP) are
subject to IA.
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of the working languages of the Commission, but they tend
to be written mainly in English. The decision not to translate
into all Community languages was driven by the fact that
DG Translation was not in a position to be able to translate
all IAs within a timeframe which would not lead to the
policy-making process grinding to a halt. This position,
however, raised a number of issues in terms of transparency
and the effective use of IAs to
better inform debate and
negotiation in the legislative
process. Responding to
demands from some Mem-
ber States (notably Spain and
Italy) and some stakeholder
groups, the Commission
agreed in July 2006 to
prepare an Executive Sum-
mary of the IA Report. This
summary would be of a
maximum length of ten
pages and would be translated into all Community
languages.
The second, more fundamental, reason for the SEC
document reference is to underline that the IA Report is not
a political document and, as such, never receives political
endorsement by the College of Commissioners. This is
meant to reinforce the point that IA is prepared as a means
of better informing political discussion and debate, and not
as a way of dictating a political outcome.
At least one month before the planned date for the
launch of the formal process of Inter-Service Consultation,4
the draft IA Report is submitted by the lead DG to the Impact
Assessment Board for its scrutiny and opinion on its overall
quality. The IAB was established to work under the direct
authority of the Commission President, and independently
of DG influence. It was the Commission’s response to an
intensifying call from some stakeholders, MEPs, and Member
States (most notably Germany during its Presidency of the
EU) for the setting-up of an external body to examine the
quality of Commission Impact Assessments. Some observers
went even further and demanded that an external body be
given responsibility for preparing the IAs. Both suggestions
were felt to raise uncomfortable issues for the Commission
in terms of its exclusive right to propose legislation.
Nevertheless, the high-level political support that they
enjoyed in some quarters was enough to convince the
Commission that its previous mechanisms of quality control
and support were not enough to ensure a uniformly high
standard in its IA work.
The IAB consists of five senior officials drawn from the
areas of the Commission with the most direct link to the
three dimensions required to be addressed in any
Commission IA i.e. Economic, Social and Environmental. It
is chaired by the Deputy Secretary General, and the
members come from DGs Economic and Financial Affairs
(ECFIN), Enterprise and Industry (ENTR), Environment (ENV),
and Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL). All members
are nominated by their DGs, but are appointed ad personam
by the President. As such they are expected to be independent
of influence from their DG and to excuse themselves from
consideration of any draft IA Report where there could be
a conflict of interest.
The IAB will examine the draft IA Report and offer
recommendations on areas where it believes further work
may be necessary. At present there is no authority for the
IAB to veto an IA Report, although it can ask for it to be
resubmitted for further scrutiny. However, there is an
implicit understanding that failure by the lead DG to fully
take on board the IAB’s opinion will be used as a justification
by the SG (and possibly other DGs) for a suspended or
negative opinion in Inter-Service Consultation.
Once the Board has scrutinised the draft IA Report and
the lead DG has completed
its remedial work, the IA
Report accompanies the
draft proposal into Inter-
Service Consultation. As
already made clear, it is
perfectly possible for weak-
nesses in the IA Report to be
used as justification for a
suspended or unfavourable
opinion in this process. This
can also be the opportunity
for DGs who have not been
as involved in the preparation of the IA as they would have
liked to have been, to give a suspended opinion until such
time as their concerns about the IA have been taken into
account.
A further possible step prior to the IA and related
proposal appearing on the Commission agenda is for the
IA to be discussed by one or more of the Groups of
Commissioners, established under the Barroso Commission.
This is most likely to be the Group of Commissioners on
Competitiveness and Growth, but it is also possible that the
Group of Commissioners on Fundamental Rights will
examine the IA to see if it has adequately considered the
issue of fundamental rights as part of its analysis. Although
there is certainly scope for greater use of IAs at the political
level in the Commission,5 some Impact Assessments
accompanying high-profile proposals have been subject to
intense debate at Cabinet level and/or in the Group of
Commissioners on Competitiveness and Growth e.g. the
Clean Air for Europe Directive. As the IAB continues to
drive-up the overall quality and comprehensiveness of the
analysis in individual IAs, it is to be expected that their
usefulness in political discussions will become more widely
appreciated.
Once the proposal is adopted by the College; it is
published together with the IA Report and the IAB opinion
on the draft IA Report on the Commission’s Impact
Assessment web pages on the Europa website.6 The
proposal, Explanatory Memorandum and IA Report are
then transmitted to the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament.
The Inter-Institutional Dimension The Inter-Institutional Dimension The Inter-Institutional Dimension The Inter-Institutional Dimension The Inter-Institutional Dimension
The shared responsibility for considering the consequences
of new legislation was first formally recognised in the
December 2003 Inter-Institutional Agreement [IIA] on Better
Lawmaking,7 in which the Council, Commission and
European Parliament all recognised the value of IA in terms
of improving the quality of EU legislation. The IIA went on
to state that:
“...Parliament and Council may [emphasis added], on
the basis of jointly defined criteria and procedures,
have impact assessments carried out prior to the
adoption of any substantive amendment, either at first
reading or at the conciliation stage”.
The IA Report is required to
be completed in all cases,
even when a decision has
been taken not to proceed
with the proposal.
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It also called upon the three institutions to consider the
possibility of developing a “common methodology” for
carrying out IA throughout the policy-making and legislative
processes. The outcome of the discussions between the
three institutions falls short of being a “common
methodology”. Instead it is more a set of “traffic rules” for
how IA is to be used throughout the policy-making and
legislative processes. This so-called “Common Approach
to Impact Assessment” was given political endorsement by
the Council and Commission in November 2005, and by
the European Parliament in July 2006. It includes a
commitment to review experiences and examine how to
proceed further after a period of two years. This process of
review is presently beginning to get underway.
The “Common Approach” begins by setting out a
number of general principles relating to IA. These include
an agreement that decisions need to be made “after giving
careful consideration to the available evidence”, and that
IA should not prejudice the respective roles and
responsibilities of the institutions. It further states that each
institution will be responsible for its own IA work, and that
all such work needs to be integrated and cross-dimensional
i.e. giving equal consideration to the economic, social and
environmental dimensions. All three institutions agree that
IA should not be used to delay the legislative process or to
oppose legislation or amendments. It reaffirms that IA – at
all stages of the policy-making and legislative processes –
is not a substitute for democratic political decision-making.
The Commission’s commitments in the “Common
Approach” are much in line with what it had already set out
in its June 2005 IA Guidelines. For example, it states that
the minimum standards for consultation will apply to IA;
and it agrees that “as a general rule” IA will be carried out
on all items in the CLWP. Furthermore, it states that the
Commission may decide to complement its original IA in
the light of previously unavailable data, etc. However, the
Commission has made it clear that the main purpose of its
IA is as an aid to internal Commission decision-making. For
this reason it cannot be forced by the Council or Parliament
to re-visit or re-do the IA. Similarly, it cannot be forced by
the Council and Parliament to do an IA on a proposal where
it has judged it to be unnecessary or inappropriate. Essentially
the Commission has sought to avoid a situation where the
IA becomes the focus of the negotiation, rather than the
proposal itself. The Commission IA is sent to the other
institutions to provide some background data and
information, and to allow Member States and MEPs to see
the evidence which the Commission considered prior to
deciding on how or whether to proceed.
Both Council and the European Parliament agree in the
“Common Approach” that they will “examine” the
Commission IA alongside the initiative itself. They also
agree to go further than the IIA and make a firm commitment
to carry our IA on “substantive amendments” to Commission
proposals. However, this “commitment” is heavily qualified.
The definition of “substantive” is left for the individual
institution to determine. Furthermore, such IA on substantive
amendments will be carried out only “when appropriate
and necessary for the legislative process”. At the time of
writing there would appear to be little immediate prospect
of an IA on a substantive amendment being carried out by
the Council. However, there have been some examples of
IAs being carried out by EP committees, and the budget set
aside by the EP for such studies is growing on an annual
basis (from €500 000 in 2006 to €700 000 in 2007).
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
Impact Assessment is intended to have direct (and positive)
effects in terms of providing a better evidence base for
internal Commission decision-making. The extent to which
it is leading to improved outputs in terms of “better”
proposals for legislation or regulation is still an open
question, and perhaps it is unfair to focus attention on the
role of the Commission in improving the regulatory
environment for Europe’s businesses and citizens, when
there is a great deal of potential for poor regulatory
outcomes to result from ill-conceived and/or ill-considered
amendments to Commission proposals, or from badly-
transposed legislation. Nevertheless, there is already clear
indications that the introduction and more systematic
application of the IA approach is resulting in some important
and potentially far-reaching changes in the policy-making
and legislative processes of the European Union.
NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
* Craig Robertson, Senior Lecturer, Unit “European Decision-
Making” EIPA.
1 The author worked as a UK Seconded National Expert in the
Secretariat General of the European Commission from 2003
to 2007, during which time he worked in the Strategic
Planning and Programming Unit and the Better Regulation
and Impact Assessment Unit. His area of responsibility included
the 2005 revision of the Impact Assessment Guidelines; the
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Assessment Board in 2006.
2 European Commission, COM(2002)276, Impact Assessment,
Brussels: June 2002.
3 European Commission, COM(2002)704, Towards a reinforced
culture of consultation and dialogue – General Principles and
Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by
the Commission , Brussels: June 2002.
4 This is the process by which other services or Directorates-
General of the European Commission give their approval or
otherwise on the proposal from the lead DG.
5 The evaluation of the IA system carried out for the Commission
by The Evaluation Partnership examined this issue and, although
the evidence it presented was largely anecdotal, it concluded
that political decision-makers were not using IA as much as it
is intended to be used.
6 http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/practice_en.htm
7 2003/C 321/01.
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